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plans discuss matter with him. Said that Chancellor planning send personal letter de Gaulle immediate future stressing and explaining his concern implications and consequences proposals.

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I feel von Eckardt's recommendation re coordination lines public statements in event press discussion well founded and would like suggest this be done soonest Washington. Although von Eckardt did not repeat not mention French, consider equally important Paris be prepared make statement consistent with line followed by four other capitals.

Von Eckardt's comments, which undoubtedly reflect Chancellor's views, confirm importance we avoid reacting to de Gaulle memorandum in way which would lend credence to idea we prepared grant French special position comparable with that enjoyed by British. Even

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caution, would take no repeat no steps at first, and would exercise controls in just same way Soviets, "possibly even more smoothly". Perhaps 6 weeks later, GDR would say that all Germans travelling to or from Berlin must obtain GDR approval. This would have effect practice sealing off Berlin from FedRep and choking it economically and politically to point collapse.

Brentano stressed his opinion if Western Powers do not repeat not react to first step with utmost firmness and determination, avalanche will be let loose which nothing will be able stop, with catastrophic consequences for Europe and free world: "the West would then have lost the first bloodless blow of Third World War."

Brentano stressed repeatedly "in full awareness responsibilities he was assuming" his conviction that firm stand now repeat now would cause Soviets back down. In this connection he had been horrified ("konsterniert") by paper [redacted] given him last night, (Embtel 1080) in particular by the 3 alternatives of which last accepts de facto recognition GDR. He regretted have to say that those who had worked on this papsr were grossly ignorant of its implications and consequences. At this point, I said that we had also

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standing orders traffic to and from Berlin, allied intention regard substitution Soviet by GDR officials certain to be increasingly criticized in Berlin where it is already hot issue. He feels in any event since receipt of Soviet note GDR officials cannot plausibly be treated as Soviet agents. Therefore, in opinion FedRep Govt, standing orders should be reexamined immediately and, it hopes, changed.

I said U. S. Govt internally was already in process of reexamining orders but had not yet consulted with other FonOffices concerned about possibility changes. Brentano declared himself content to have us report this to respective Govts.

3. FonMin thinks most practicable ~~plaza~~ place for a working party to deal with answer to Soviet note and other matters arising out of it would be Bonn.

Seydoux said this question should be put to FonMin in Paris; I agreed. Steel strongly favors Bonn.

4. FonMin believes important at Paris meeting determine (a) what report should be made to NATO re deliberations four FonMins; (b) degree

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took the 9:30 train to Germany.

Looking back on this past week in Paris, I consider it a great success. At the tripartite meeting, the United States, France and the U. K. agreed [redacted] to avoid any recognition of the GDR. This resulted from a position taken in Washington with the approval of the National Security Council and President Eisenhower. At the same meeting, it was agreed that the question of the military reaction to any Soviet or East German move regarding Berlin would be further discussed between the Governments. The Ambassadors in Bonn of the three powers were instructed together with their military advisers to work out new access procedures. The feeling was unanimous not to accept the substitution for Soviet authority of that asserted by the GDR.

At the Council meeting, Dulles's pronouncement of American readiness, if necessary, to resort to a general war in the face of aggression, had a tremendous effect. We can now continue our policy toward Berlin with the unanimous backing of our European allies.

Saturday, December 20, 1958

Arrived at Bad Godesberg this morning. At the office forenoon and afternoon. Bill Trimble told me his agrément had been asked of the Cambodian Government. He is concerned over the

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